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Recent Cases
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NOTICE AND
COMMENT PROCEDURE DOES NOT INVALIDATE MEMORANDUM OF

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OFCCP AND EEOC. Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977).
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld' the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld the validity of a Memorandum of Understanding
between the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The
controversial Memorandum 2 required that information be exchanged between the two agencies 3 and further provided that individual complaints
of discrimination filed with a compliance agency would be deemed
charges filed with the EEOC. 4 The appellate court concluded that the
agreement was neither an unlawful delegation of the compliance office's
authority nor an improperly promulgated rule, invalid for failure to
conform with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 5

Both the OFCCP and the EEOC are responsible for eliminating
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin in employment. The OFCCP, however, has a more circumscribed
role; its involvement only extends to government contractors6 and its
focus is upon systemic discrimination. Established pursuant to Executive
Order 11,2467 the agency may terminate or suspend a contract 8 and bar
further bidding by a noncomplying contractor on future government
contracts. 9 Obviously these remedies are inappropriate for isolated, indi1. 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nor. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brown,
46 U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. April 25, 1978) (No. 77-1097).
2. The Memorandum of Understanding is published in 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1974). It
superseded an earlier version in 35 Fed. Reg. 18,461 (1970). The Memorandum is also
published in an appendix to the lower court's opinion, Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
417 F. Supp. 365, 374-76 (E.D. Va. 1976).
3. Paragraphs 1,2,6,7,8, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855-56 (1974).
4. Id. at 35,856.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
6. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1977, 63-67 [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT].

7. Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, Note at 10,294 (1970).
8. § 209(5), 3 C.F.R. at 344 (1964-65 Compilation).
9. § 209(6), 3 C.F.R. at 344 (1964-65 Compilation).

vidual cases of discrimination. In contrast, the EEOC has responsibility
for investigating and resolving complaints of violations of Title VII.
Upon receipt of a discriminatory employment practice charge, the EEOC

conducts an investigation, attempts conciliation, if appropriate, and, in0
certain cases in which conciliatory attempts fail, prosecutes the charge.'
The purpose of the Memorandum between the agencies was to maximize
efforts to enforce equal employment opportunity by eliminating conflict,

competition, duplication, and inconsistencies between the agencies' operations and functions.]1
Reynolds Metals, a government contractor holding contracts from
the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) of the Department of Defense, initiated the action by filing for declaratory and injunctive relief. It sought to

restrain DSA, the compliance agency, from transmitting to the more
adversarial EEOC information submitted by Reynolds concerning its
affirmative action programs. 12 The EEOC had requested copies of the
information from the DSA pursuant to the Memorandum.1 3 Reynolds was

not required to submit this information to the EEOC, nor had it voluntarily agreed to do so. 4 Because Reynolds preferred that the information
remain exclusively with the compliance agency, the company contested
the legality of the Memorandum. 15
The district court, however, rejected Reynold's contentions that the
Memorandum was violative of the Federal Reports Act, 16 invalid for
failure to include the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating
Council as a party,'17 contrary to the congressional intent underlying the
10. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5,
2000e-8, 2000e-9 (Supp. 111972). See also CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note
6, at 178.
11.
39 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1974).
12. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Va. 1976).
13. The information submitted by Reynolds concerned its affirmative action programs
at its Sheffield, Alabama facility. The compliance agency would compile this information in
a compliance review report to evaluate Reynolds' implementation of and commitment to the
policy of equal opportunity in its employment practices.
14. 417 F. Supp. at 368. Apparently, the EEOC had not utilized the investigatory
procedures afforded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. 11 1972) to obtain the information
directly from Reynolds by means of an administrative subpoena.
15. Reynolds characterized the EEOC as having a "more hostile and adversarial
nature" than the OFCCP, and the district court considered this as the "real reason for
plaintiff's concern" over the information transfer provisions of the Memorandum. Id. at
372.
16. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3511 (1970). The district court assumed that the subject matter
covered by the Memorandum was "information" as defined by the Act. 417 F. Supp. at 370.
The court noted that an agency declaration of confidentiality, required by 44 U.S.C. §
3508(b)(2), had not been complied with, and, therefore, Reynolds could not object to the
disclosure of information. 417 F. Supp. at 371. The court also ruled that "Reynolds, in
contracting with the government, explicitly consented to the information being used to
administer Title VII and, thereby, implicitly consented to the information being made
available to Title VII's enforcing agency, the EEOC," for the purposes of 44 U.S.C. §
3508(b)(3). 417 F. Supp. at 371.
17. 417 F. Supp. at 373. The Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council
has been ineffectual in coordinating the activities of agencies that enforce equal employment opportunity. Two member agencies, the EEOC and the Commission on Civil Rights,

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,18 violative of the statutorily-defined EEOC information-gathering procedures, 19 and invalid for
failure to comply with the requirement of the General Service Administration that its approval be obtained before data could be transmitted

between agencies. 20 Although the district court ruled for the government
on these issues, it granted Reynolds a permanent injunction restraining
defendants from implementing the provisions of paragraph ten of the
Memorandum. 21 This paragraph provided that complaints filed with the
OFCCP are "deemed charges filed with EEOC" 22 and that the OFCCP
should "promptly transmit such charges to the appropriate EEOC District
Office. '"23 The parties stipulated that the Memorandum was a rule as
defined in the APA, 24 but contested the issue whether it had been

promulgated in compliance with the requirements of the APA. 25 Applying the "substantial impact"

test ,26 the district court concluded that

have suggested abolition of the Council. See CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra

note 6, at 294-98. Reynolds offered no authority supporting its contention that the Council
was a necessary party to the Memorandum. 417 F. Supp. at 373.
18. "The refusal of Congress to merge OFCCP into the EEOC cannot reasonably be
interpreted as forbidding all cooperation between the two agencies." 417 F. Supp. at 373. It
was not necessary for the district court to address the issue whether paragraph ten, which
provided that complaints filed with a compliance office would be deemed charges filed with
the EEOC, violated the congressional intent because the court invalidated that provision on
other grounds. Id. See notes 50, 51 infra.
19. 417 F. Supp. at 373. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. 11 1972) provides the EEOC with
the investigatory devices of the NLRB as explained in the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970) i.e., administrative subpoenas). Reynolds' argument focused
upon the ability of the EEOC to obtain information without a subpoena by requesting
information from the OFCCP as provided in the Memorandum. By circumventing the need
for a subpoena, the EEOC deprived Reynolds of the ability to challenge the transmission of
information, which Reynolds could do by challenging the breadth or scope of a subpoena.
The court reasoned that subpoenas were necessary only when information was required
directly from a party because a reporting demand might be burdensome. There was no
reason to require a subpoena because only exchanges of information between agencies were
involved, not direct reporting demands. 417 F. Supp. at 373.
20. The court deemed the Interagency Reports Management Program, 41 C.F.R. §§
101-11.1100 through 11.1109 (1977), applicable only when one agency was required to gather
information for another. The regulations were not controlling because Reynolds had to
submit, independent of the Memorandum, all of the information that the OFCCP, in turn,
transmitted to the EEOC. 417 F. Supp. at 373-74.
21. 417 F. Supp. at 374.
22. 39 Fed. 35,855-56 (1974).
23. Id.
24. 417 F. Supp. at 372. A "rule" is "the whole or part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency . . . .

5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).

25. The Memorandum was published in the Federal Register as required by 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(1) (1976). It, however, was not promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976),
which requires both notice and opportunity for interested persons to comment upon the
proposed rule or rules.
Furthermore, § 709(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-8(c)(3) (Supp. I 1972) requires a public hearing when the EEOC issues regulations
requiring reports "necessary or appropriate" for the enforcement of Title VII. The district
court, reasoning that the statute was intended to permit employers to comment before they
were subjected to burdensome paperwork, found the statutory provision inapplicable when
the EEOC did not make direct reporting demands on the employer. 417 F. Supp. at 373.
26. In applying the "substantial" or "substantive impact" test, a court focuses on
whether the rule creates or alters the existing rights or obligations of parties subject to the

compliance with the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure was essential to the adoption of paragraph ten. 27 Nevertheless, because the
Memorandum was severable, the invalidity of this paragraph did not
28
affect the remainder of the Memorandum.

On appeal, 29 the circuit court summarily sustained the district court's
rulings that paragraphs one, two, eight, and nine, the information exchange provisions of the Memorandum, were valid. 30 Furthermore, the

court rejected Reynolds' claim that the information it had supplied DSA
was protected by the privilege for self-evaluative documents 3' because

Reynolds had notice that the information would be used
for the enforce32

ment of both Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII.
The court then addressed the issues presented by paragraph ten 33 and
reversed the district court's decision in this respect. Sustaining the valid-

ity of paragraph ten against Reynolds' charge that it unlawfully delegated
the authority of the compliance office, the court noted that agencies, by
directly transmitting complaints alleging a Title VII violation to the
EEOC, avoid wasteful duplicity. 34 It reasoned that neither "irresponsible" inaction by the compliance office upon receipt of such a com-

plaint, 35 nor a return of the complaint with a suggestion that it be sent to
rule. Although widely utilized, the test suffers from two serious deficiencies. First, it
affords no predictable guidance for agencies promulgating rules. Second, the requirement of
notice-and-comment procedure when interpretive or procedural rules or general statements
of policy are involved is difficult to reconcile with the APA's exemption of those rules from
the notice-and-comment procedure. See Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 520, 545-553, 558-59 (1977). See
notes 42, 44 infra.
27. 417 F. Supp. at 372. See notes 50, 49 and accompanying text infra.
28. Id. The district court found that the other provisions of the Memorandum did not
have a substantial impact because they involved only the exchange of information. The
court reasoned that Reynolds could challenge the use of any documents in future litigation.
Under this rationale, however, paragraph ten should have also been sustained. Reynolds
could have challenged this provision had further litigation ensued. See notes 51, 52 and
accompanying text infra.
29. The government cross-appealed from the determination that paragraph ten was
invalid after Reynolds had appealed from the district court's rulings on the remaining issues.
30. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub
nom. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brown, 46 U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. April 25, 1978) (No. 77-1097).
The court of appeals affirmed because of the district court's "thorough consideration of
these issues . . . . '

d. at 667. Reynolds' argument that a hearing was required for each

interagency exchange of information had been rejected by the district court. Apparently,
this rejection was the focus of the court of appeals' statement that the district court "found
no violation of the principles of administrative due process." Id.
31. The district court did not address this claim of privilege, "probably because
Reynolds presented it only obliquely." 564 F.2d at 667.
32. Id. The regulation requiring reports from government contractors expressly provides that these reports will be used for the administration of both Executive Order 11,246
and Title VII even though they are supplied only to a compliance agency. See 41 C.F.R. §
60-1.7(c) (1977). See also note 16 and accompanying text supra.
33. See notes 22, 23 and accompanying text supra. The OFCCP had modified its
regulations when the appeal was taken to allow it to refer appropriate complaints to the
EEOC. It utilized notice-and-comment procedure. See 42 Fed. Reg. 3,454, 3,455 (1977).
Nevertheless, the Memorandum was not modified or rescinded. 564 F.2d at 668 n.9.
34. 564 F.2d at 668-69.
35. Id. at 668.

the EEOC were satisfactory alternatives for "the simple procedure estab-

lished by paragraph 10."36 Furthermore, the compliance office's conception of how individual and systemic discrimination should be remedied
was based on "a reasonable interpretation" of Executive Order 11, 246.7
Thus, there was no unlawful delegation of authority.
Contending that the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure was
inapplicable, 38 the government relied on the APA exemption for "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 39 Like the district court, the court of
appeals applied the "substantial impact" test to determine whether the
rule was "exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the
statute. "4 Although the court of appeals reached a different result than

the district court, like the district court it misconstrued the purpose of the
test.
The court's statement that the test distinguishes "between substance
and procedure in the context of administrative rulemaking" is inaccurate. 41 It is not the impact on existing rights, duties, obligations, relationships, or status that determines whether a rule is subject to the APA's
notice and comment procedure. Rather, as Professor Davis has noted, the
determinative issue is whether Congress has delegated to the agency
42
power to make substantive rules that have the force of law.
36. Id. at 669.
37. Id.
38. The purpose of notice-and-comment procedure is two-fold: (I) it operates as a
procedural safeguard to protect private interests and (2) it ensures that the agency's action in
adopting a rule is predicated upon a knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks of various
courses of action. See Warren, The Notice Requirement in Administrative Rulemaking: An
Analysis of Legislative and Interpretive Rules, 29 AD. L. REv. 367, 376-77 (1977).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976). This exemption and judicial decisions interpreting it
have been problematic. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 6.01-10
(1976); Asimow, supra note 26; Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation
in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy underthe A.P.A., 23
AD. L. REV. 101 (1971); Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative
Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047 (1976); Warren, supra note 38;
Note, Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction: Semantical Feinting
with an Exception to Rulemaking Procedures, 54 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1976); Comment, A
Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 430 (1976).
40. 564 F.2d at 669.
41. Id. The substantial impact test should not be used as a definitional tool. By
utilizing it to determine whether the rule is subject to the APA notice-and-comment procedure, the court, however, applied the test as it if were definitional. This erroneous application could create the anomalous effects of exempting a legislative rule that has slight impact
from the notice-and-comment procedure expressly mandated by § 553 of the APA and
requiring this procedure for procedural or interpretive rules having substantial impact,
despite an express statutory exemption for those rules.
The confusion about how the substantial impact test should be applied has been
compounded by courts that have equated "substantive" and "legislative." See Asimow,
supra note 26, at 523 n.11.
42. The idea is not that an interpretative rule having substantial impact should be
treated as a legislative rule; doing that would mean that the rule would have binding
effect on courts, and no agency should have power to make rules binding on courts
unless Congress has conferred such power; therefore, substantial impact cannot

Notice-and-comment procedure, although it is not mandated by the

APA, may be warranted even though Congress has not delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency. Courts should not invoke the

substantial impact test to construe the APA as requiring use of notice-andcomment procedure for the promulgation of rules the APA expressly
exempts from such procedure. Yet, this is implicit in a court's conclusion
that the APA requires notice and comment as a prerequisite to the
adoption of an interpretive or procedural rule or agency statement of

policy that has a "substantive impact on the rights and duties of the
person subject to regulation." 43 The basis for requiring notice and
comment under these circumstances should be either administrative due
44
process or the common-law concept of basic fairness, not the APA.
Congress did not delegate legislative authority to the EEOC,4 5 but only
"authority . . . to issue . . . suitable procedural regulations . . . . 6
Hence, under traditional analysis, the procedural mandates of section 553
of the APA are inapplicable because that section exempts
procedural and
47
interpretive rules from notice-and-comment procedure.
The court of appeals reached the same result by finding that paragraph ten had no substantive effect, and, therefore, could not be invalidated for the agencies' failure to afford an opportunity for comment
before its adoption. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon
considerations of administrative efficiency and judicial precedent
concerning Title VII's filing requirements. It determined that paragraph
ten neither diminished nor increased Reynold's rights or duties under
48
Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII.
The district court had found that because Reynolds would be exposed to liability within 180 days after the filing of a charge with the
EEOC, paragraph ten had a substantial impact.19 Apparently, the district
turn an interpretative rule into a legislative rule. The idea is not that § 553 should
apply to interpretative rules that have a substantial impact; that would contradict §
553, which clearly exempts interpretative rules from the procedural requirements
of § 553.
K. DAVIS 1976, supra note 39, at 193.
43. 564 F.2d at 669.
44. "The idea is that, apart from § 553 the courts, which are experts on problems of
procedural fairness, may hold that fairness requires opportunity for party participation in
rulemaking that has a substantial impact, even though Congress in the APA has not required
such opportunity." K. DAVIS 1976, supra note 39, at 193.
The district court noted that Reynolds' challenge to paragraph ten was closely related
to an administrative due process challenge, but the issue was not fully developed. See
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365, 371-72 (E.D. Va. 1976).
45. The court of appeals cited one of its own decisions that expressly acknowledged
this fact, EEOC v. Raymond Metal Products Co., 530 F.2d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1976). 564 F.2d
at 669.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970).
47. See Asimow, supra note 26, at 542-43; Warren, supra note 38, at 391.
48. Id, at 669. Rather, "[it simply provides an expeditious means of transmitting to
the Commission complaints that should have been mailed to it in the first place." Id.
49. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. Va. 1976). The
district court considered, in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. 11 1972)
permitting suit 180 days after a filing with the EEOC, paragraph ten, which was an entirely
new method of initiating the "EEOC's own procedural mechanism." 417 F. Supp. at 372.

court presumed that paragraph ten shortened the period for conciliatory
attempts by the EEOC. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive how this
abbreviation substantially affected Reynolds' rights.50 Furthermore, be-

cause legislative authority has not been delegated to the EEOC, a court
need not deem that a complaint filed with the OFCCP was filed with the

EEOC. Nor must the court defer to a rule if the court finds that it does not
1
5
express the congressional will.
Nonetheless, the effect of paragraph ten on the period of limitation

in Title VII might be considered a substantial impact. 52 In effect, this
provision might permit suits that otherwise would have been barred by the
period of limitation because the charges were filed erroneously. Although
this issue was not before the court of appeals, 53 the court nonetheless
relied upon judicial precedent that determined the effect of filing a charge

with a compliance office on the Title VII period of limitations.54 It would
appear, however, that a court could find that paragraph ten had a substantial impact only if it relied on the Memorandum to the exclusion of case
law. The sole effect of paragraph ten was to provide public notice of an

administrative interpretation of the effect of filing a charge with a
55
compliance office consonant with judicial interpretations.
Considering the difficulties created by the organizational structure of
the federal equal employment opportunity enforcement effort5 6 and Reynolds' technical and obstructionist challenges to the Memorandum, the
Fourth Circuit reached the proper result. The court properly considered
administrative expedience in reaching a decision that avoids increased
costs 57 and "technical bars" 58 to the administration of Title VII. Unfortu50. The 180 day period would not necessarily be shortened if the OFCCP expeditiously transmitted misfiled complaints to the EEOC. Furthermore, Reynolds could have challenged paragraph ten in future litigation on the ground that a filing with a compliance office
did not constitute a filing with the EEOC. See note 28 supra.
51. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976) with Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IT 1972) requires that a charge of discrimination be
filed with the EEOC within 180 days of its occurrence.
53. 564 F.2d at 670 n.12.
54. Egelston v. State Univ. College at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 755 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. Collator Corp., 7 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1258 (9th Cir. 1974), (Mem.) summarily
rev'g 7 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 934 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (district court dismissed action on
ground that filing was untimely because filing with OFCC was not adequate compliance).
55. E.g., EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 416 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (D. Del. 1976). See
also note 54 supra.
56. See CIVIL RiGHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1977, supra note 6, at 331-33. The
EEOC "has been more successful in coordinating with other Federal agencies on a bilateral
basis than through the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council." Id. at 241.
The EEOC is expressly authorized to cooperate with other government agencies by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(l) (Supp. 11 1972).
57. The court of appeals noted that the same result that was effected by paragraph ten
could be obtained if the EEOC stationed employees at compliance offices. 564 F.2d at 669.
58. 564 F.2d at 670. Administrative efficiency is a relevant consideration in determining the utility and applicability of notice-and-comment procedure. See Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to
Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 453-55 (1976).

nately, by neglecting to articulate an extra-statutory justification for the
substantial impact test, the court obfuscated the procedural fairness basis

for imposing a notice-and-comment requirement. Most significantly, it
failed to reconcile the substantial impact test with the APA, a reconcilia59
tion that is essential if the test is to survive Supreme Court review.
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Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me,

1977).
The Federal District Court of Maine in Caswell v. Califano' held
that applicants for social security disability benefits were entitled to a
hearing to challenge benefit denials before an administrative law judge
within ninety days of request. Judge Gignoux posited that the Social

Security Act (SSA) 2 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 3 required that a hearing be held within a reasonable time, which in the
context of disability benefits was ninety days. The court also noted that a
similar result could be reached on constitutional grounds.'
The Title II disability insurance program, which was devised in

1956, provides that "[i]f a worker or one of his surviving dependents,
who normally would not qualify for social security benefits until achiev-

ing retirement age, becomes disabled, he may begin to receive his
retirement benefits at once and need not wait until retirement age is

reached." 5 The disability insurance application process is a complex and
repetitive scheme, 6 requiring a Title II applicant to advance through
several intra-agency appeals before he is entitled to a hearing with an

administrative law judge.7
59. See notes 41-44 and accompanying test supra. Because application of the substantial impact test, in its present form, can produce results that clearly conflict with the APA, it
Iseems an unlikely candidate to survive Supreme Court review." Asimow, supra note 26,
at 559 (footnote omitted).
[Casenote by Robert A. Gallagher]
1. 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (1976).
4. See notes 43-60 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the applicability
of fifth amendment due process requirements.
5. David & Reynolds, Profile of a Social Security Disability Case, 42 Mo. L. REv.
541, 542 (1977).
6. The Title II disability program application scheme was described in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) in the following terms:
The disability insurance program is administered jointly by state and federal
agencies. State agencies make the initial determination whether a disability exists,
when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a). The standards applied and
the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421(b), who has
delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed.
Reg. 4473 (1975).
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tion that is essential if the test is to survive Supreme Court review.
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The Caswell case was a class action8 seeking relief from the inordinate delay between the disposition of the final intra-agency appeal and an
In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits a
worker must demonstrate that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(I)(A).

To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423(d)(3), that he has a
physical or mental impairment of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The continuing-eligibility investigation is made by a state agency acting through a "team"
consisting of a physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability evaluation. The
agency periodically communicates with the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case
he is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and requests information concerning
his present condition, including current medical restrictions and sources of treatment, and
any additional information that he considers relevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. CM § 6705.1; Disability Insurance State Manual (DISM) § 353.3 (TL No. 137, Mar. 5,
1975).
Information regarding the recipient's current condition is also obtained from his
sources of medical treatment. DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the information
provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or
between two sources of treatment, the agency may arrange for an examination by an
independent consulting physician. Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative assessment of the
beneficiary's condition differs from his own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that
benefits may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence upon which the proposed
determination to terminate is based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical
reports and other evidence in his case file. He also may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. Id., § 353.6
The state agency then makes its final determination, which is reviewed by an examiner
in the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 421(c); CM §§ 6701(b),(c). If, as is
usually the case, the SSA accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient in
writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, and of his right to seek de novo
reconsideration by the state agency. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907,404.909 (1975). Upon acceptance
by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective two months after the month in which medical
recovery is found to have occurred. 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 423(a) (1970 ed., Supp. III).
If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state agency and the determination is
adverse, the SSA reviews the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the
decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law
judge. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917, 404.927 (1975). The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not
represented by counsel. As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process,
however, the claimant may be represented by counsel or other spokesmen. §404.923. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary
review by the SSA Appeals Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.951 (1975).

Should it be determined at any point after termination of benefits, that the claimant's
disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the worker is entitled
to retroactive payments. 42 U.S.C. § 404. Cf. § 423(b); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.501, 404.503,
404.504 (1975). If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to which he is
later determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to attempt to recoup
these funds in specific circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (footnotes omitted).
7. See Note, Administrative Procedure and the Social Security Disability Program, 2
IND. LEGAL F. 295, 314 (1969).
8. [P]laintiffs' class was certified as all residents of the District of Maine who
have applied for Social Security disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423;

administrative hearing. The plaintiffs, contending that these delays violated statutory provisions and denied them due process, requested relief in

the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring hearings
within a set time limit. 9 Additionally, the plaintiffs sought interim disability benefits for applicants whose hearings were not scheduled in accord-

ance with the court's order. 1
"The basic reason for the establishment of a multitude of federal
administrative agencies has been the general belief that the matters

coming within their jurisdiction could be dealt with more expeditiously
by administrative than by legislative and judicial procedures."" In reality, this theory has not always resulted in greater efficiency, and administrative agencies can become overwhelmed with cases. 1 2 The resultant
delays in obtaining hearings or decisions are especially burdensome to
Title II disability benefit claimants 13 whose applications have been denied
since they do not receive any interim benefits while their appeal is
pending. 14 Because more than fifty percent of the appealed cases in which
benefits were denied are reversed by the administrative law judge, 15 such

tardiness unnecessarily deprives deserving claimants and reduces the
6

overall effectiveness of the disability insurance system.'
Several factors contribute to the case backlog and the resultant
delay. External causes include the additional burden placed upon Title II
administrative law judges by the enactment of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 196917 and Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
who have received a notice of initial determination from defendant denying their
applications; who have received a notice of reconsideration determination from
defendant affirming the initial denial; who have filed a timely request for hearing
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405; whose request for hearing has been pending for sixty
days or longer; and for whom a hearing date has not been scheduled.
435 F. Supp. at 129.
9. Plaintiffs initially sought an order that hearings be held within sixty days of
request. The period was later extended by plaintiffs' counsel to ninety days. Id. at 129 n.2.
10. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text infra.
I1. Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49
A.B.A.J. 833, 833 (1963).
12. Id. See also Cramton, Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay, 58 A.B.A.J. 937
(1972); Goldman, Administrative Delay and JudicialRelief, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1423 (1966);
Note, Administrative Procedureand the Social Security Disability Program, 2 IND. LEGAL
F. 295 (1969).
13. The disability benefit case backlog hit "'crisis" proportion in April 1975 when the
national backlog of pending hearing requests totaled 113,000. 435 F. Supp. at 130. While this
backlog was reduced to 87,860 by June 1976, see White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1254
n.4 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1977), substantial delays still occurred. The
plaintiffs in Caswell waited thirteen months after requesting a hearing, and the regional
average delay was eleven and one-half months. 435 F. Supp. at 131.
14. See note 6 supra.
15. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977). The administrative reversal rate for the New England Region, which included
the plaintiffs in Caswell, was only forty-five percent. 435 F. Supp. at 131. The reversal rate
elsewhere was as high as sixty-seven percent. See Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185
L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
16. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir. 1977).
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-960 (1970).

Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled (SSI). t8
Internal causes include difficulties in recruiting administrative law
20
judges 19 and the inability to use Title XVI hearing officers effectively.
While the Social Security Administration (SSA) has increased its productivity by adopting improved techniques 2 1 and legislation has added
temporary administrative law judges,22 the case backlog has not yet been
sufficiently reduced to achieve the goal of granting administrative hear23
ings within ninety days of request.

Caswell was not the first time a court was confronted with the
problems arising from lengthy Title II hearing delays. The federal district
courts of Vermont, 24 Connecticut, 25 and Western Kentucky 26 all awarded
judgment to disability applicants seeking relief from the same torpidity.

The Caswell court based jurisdiction to remedy this tardiness upon the
federal mandamus statute empowering district courts to "compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plaintiff" 2 7 and upon the Social Security Act provi-

sions providing for review of "any final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing to which [the applicant] was a party. "28
In deciding the substantive issues, the court examined the Social Security 29 and the Administrative 30 Procedure Acts and discerned a statutory
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383C (1970).
19. This results because "other civil service hearing examiner positions were paid
more." White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
20. Id. The source of this difficulty was "an interpretation of the Civil Service
Commission that the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable to S.S.I. hearings
and which required the appointment of non-A.P.A. hearings officers who could not hear
Social Security and medicare cases." S. REP. No. 94-550, 94th Cong., IstSess., 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2349, 2350. This report was a prelude to the enactment of 42
U.S.C.A. § 1383 (Supp. 1977), which gave the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
temporary authority to use Title XVI hearings examiners to hear Title II appeals. Concurrent attempts to set a maximum time limit on the scheduling and determination of Title 11
administrative hearings failed. 435 F. Supp. at 131 n.4.
21. See Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Me. 1977); White v. Mathews,
434 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 (2d Cir. 1977); S. REP. No. 94-550, 94th
Cong., IstSess., 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2349.
24. Barnett v. Mathews (D. Vt. February 22, 1977); Barnett v. Weinberger, Civ. No.
74-270 (D. Vt. January 13, 1976).
25. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977).
26. Blankenship v. Mathews, Civ. No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D.Ky. May 6, 1976).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
29. The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1974), which reads in part as follows:
The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of
any individual applying for a payment under this sub-chapter. Upon request by any
such individual . . . who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights may be
prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has rendered, he shall give such applicant
• . .reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision,
and, if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing,
affirm, modify or reverse his findings of fact and such decision.
30. The court referred to 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1977) which provides that "[w]ith due
regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a
reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it," and 5

duty to provide a hearing within a meaningful time. Because the delays
were unreasonable, the court found a violation of that duty.
Although no previous cases 3' discussed the applicability of mandamus and administrative procedure statutes to the problem of disability
benefit hearing delays, the need to rectify administrative delay has been
considered in several contexts. 3 2 The first case 33 addressing the statutory
duty of prompt administrative action made it clear that dilatory administrative actions were forbidden:
[T]he requirement in [the Administrative Procedure Act] 34 . . .
is an affirmative statutory declaration of the congressional purpose that the requirement in . . . [the Administrative Procedure Act] that agency action be concluded with reasonable
dispatch, gives rise to legally enforceable rights of the parties to
the proceeding. Its formally declared intention is fully supported by the legislative history. The committee report in the
Senate said that the requirement that agencies proceed with
reasonable dispatch to conclude the matter presented is a "legal
requirement" that an agency shall not deny relief or fail to
conclude a case by mere inaction. Of the same requirement the
report of the committee in the House says that no agency "shall
in effect deny relief or fail to conclude a case by mere inaction,
or proceed in a dilatory fashion to the injury of the person
concerned. No agency should permit any person to suffer
35 injurious consequences upon unwarranted official delay. ",
Many courts have recognized the problems created by administrative
delay and have repeatedly warned the administrative system to "exert the
greatest resourceful, imaginative ingenuity in devising procedures which
in a day of ever expanding dockets will permit the regulatory process to
U.S.C. § 706(l) (1976) which provides that the reviewing court shall "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
31. Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A), Slip Op. at 3 (W.D. Ky. May 6,
1976).
32. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975); Calif. Human Resources Dept. v.
Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1970); Wheeler v. Vermont, 335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971), all dealing
with unemployment compensation benefit delays; Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (delay in investigation of telephone company rates); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Secretary of Agriculture's delay in acting on
DDT ban); NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Silverman v. NLRB, 543
F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1976); Deering Milliken, Inc. V. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961), all
dealing with NLRB delay; FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964) (delay in
resolving Clayton Act litigation); Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966) (SEC tardiness in
revoking broker registration); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1970) (Department of
Agriculture delay in suspending persons from commodity trading); EEOC v. Exchange
Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976); Chromcraft Corp. v. United States Emp. Op.
Comm'n, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.
Tex. 1976); EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga. 1976), all dealing with
delay in resolving Title VII violations.
33. See, Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The Right to Relief
from Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574, 577 (1963).
34. The case actually referred to § 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
was the forerunner of § 555(b) of the same act. There is, however, no significant difference
between the two sections. See Goldman, Administrative Delay and JudicialRelief, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 1423, 1447 (1966).
35. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 863 (4th Cir. 1961).

function properly with reasonable dispatch." ' 36 Unfortunately, the
judiciary has been hesitant to go beyond simple recognition to fashion
37
effective relief to eliminate delay.
In ruling that a hearing must be held within a prescribed time, the

Caswell court took affirmative steps to cure the administrative delay-. The
court's conclusion is sound in light of the plaintiffs' need for the prompt
hearing to which they are entitled. Generally, disability claimants have
limited resources, and lengthy delays may deprive recipients of their sole
means of support. 3" Moreover, because the United States Supreme Court
has held that disability benefit recipients are not entitled to a predenial

hearing,3 9 it is especially important that applicants have prompt postdenial hearings. 4° Perhaps the only justification for denying relief is that a

"mass justice' '41 system such as the SSA must be allowed considerations
of economy. Nevertheless, the Caswell court is not alone in holding that
inadequate resources will not justify violation of a federal statute. 42
Since it based its ruling on statutory interpretation the court found a
determination whether the delays constituted a violation of fifth amendment due process unnecessary. Judge Gignoux, however, expressed his
agreement with the district courts in White v. Mathews4 3 and Blanken-

ship v. Mathews, 44 which reached a similar result on constitutional
grounds.
The constitutional approach to delay can be applied to the proceedings of other administrative agencies. 45 An agency can confiscate prop36. See, e.g., FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 1964).
37. See NLRB v. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Chromcraft v. United
States Emp. Op. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346 (5th
Cir. 1970); Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966); Deering Milliken v. Johnston, 295 F.2d
856 (4th Cir. 1961). But see Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (the court noted, however,
that administrative delay is generally ill-suited to judicial review); Nelson v. Suggarmon, 361
F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. The court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976), noted the modest
resources of disability benefit recipients although it did not find the deprivation of disability
benefits sufficient to warrant a pretermination hearing. The court in Blankenship v.
Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976), however, was more sympathetic to
the needs of the disabled:
[Tlhe fact remains that . . . applicants, generally speaking, are persons who have
had very little or no income for at least some substantial period of time prior to
their filing an application for benefits. This has been made obvious to this Court by
its review of the many such cases that come to this Court for decision after
exhaustion of remedies with the H.E.W.
Slip op. at 7.
39. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
40. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
41. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 250 (1976). 97,000,000 claims were filed
under the Social Security Act in 1974. Id.
42. See cases cited in 435 F. Supp. at 135. See also Cornelius v. Minter, 395 F. Supp.
616 (D. Mass. 1974).
43. 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
45.

See

K.C. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 8 (1976); B.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 67-93.

erty as effectively by an unreasonable delay in hearing a case as by an
express taking. 6 Thus, the delay from which the plaintiff suffered could
be characterized as a taking of property that is forbidden by due process.
In considering this issue, the district courts in White and Blankenship
adopted the due process test articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedure requirement would entail."

Both district courts concluded that the delays in obtaining administrative
hearings violated due process.
In applying the due process test, a court must first consider the
claimant's interests, which include receiving disability benefit income
pending appeal and prompt disposition of the appeal. 49 The Supreme

Court has recognized that "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of
. . .benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official
50

action on the private interests."

The second element a court must consider is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such [private] interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards."'- The risk confronting the plaintiffs arose because of the
probability of reversal by the administrative law judge. 52 The risk of
erroneous deprivation resulting from "the substitute procedural safeguards" of prompt administrative hearings might exceed the risk posed
by "the procedures used" (the hearing delays) because the expedited
An individual may have an independent right to procedural due process whether the
underlying interest is a right or a privilege. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilegeDistinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1451-54 (1968). Thus,
deprivation of an interest by a governmental agency could be subject to the safeguards of
procedural due process, even though that interest may not qualify as a right. See B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 41, at §§ 67-93. Fortunately, this right-privilege analysis may be
avoided in the context of social security disability benefits because "the interest of an
individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 'property interest'
protected by the Fifth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
46. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926).
47. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48. Id. at 335.
49. See note 6 supra. See also White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn.
1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) quoted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 341 (1976).
51. Id. at 335.
52. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d
852 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A), Slip op. at 7,
(W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976). See also note 15 and accompanying text supra.

proceedings might force administrative law judges into making hasty
decisions. This increase in risk, however, is unlikely to occur.53 Thus,
regardless of the length of delay there is a strong possibility that a

decision will be reversed upon appeal to an administrative law judge.
Assuming that successful claimants are deserving recipients, the duration

of such deprivations should be minimized to prevent erroneous deprivation. Consequently, the second element of the Mathews v. Eldridge due
process test supports the requirement that administrative hearings for

disability benefit applicants be held promptly.
The final aspect of the Eldridge test is "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
54
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." ,

The government interest in this situation is the equitable and efficient
allocation of its limited resources---the "system must be fair-and it
must work."56 Reduction of the disability benefit hearing backlog will
entail increased costs, but these costs must be incurred 57 especially in
view of congressional intent that administrative matters be concluded
within a reasonable time. 58 By mandating that the disability benefit delay
be decreased, the judiciary is merely ensuring compliance with the
legislative purpose. 59
To determine what due process requires, courts must balance the
three elements outlined in Eldridge. They must compare the government

interest in resource allocation with the individual interests in a prompt
determination and the combined interest in correct administrative determinations. At least two courts have determined that these last two elements predominate and due process mandates that disability benefit
6
hearings be held within a reasonable time. 0
53. Coming now to the next criterion, that is, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of benefits by reason of a substitute procedure, that risk is not material, since the
only relief being sought is a prompt hearing. Plaintiffs do not ask for any other
change in the procedures of HEW, and the only risk of erroneous deprivation of
rights would arise if defendant should be forced into speedy, incorrect and illconsidered judgments as to the justice of the applicant's claims. We do not believe
such deprivation will occur ....
Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
54. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
55. See Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976). Slip
op. at 7.
56. Richardson v. Pearles, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
57. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261, (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d
852 (2d Cir. 1977).
58. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
59. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1977); Cornelius v. Minter,
395 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass. 1974). The Congress is cognizant of the costs to reduce the
backlog and has taken steps to increase the resources available to the SSA to help expedite
the Title I1appeals process. See Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky.
May 6, 1976). Slip op. at 7. The real question is "not whether there shall be costs incurred,
but who shall bear them while the governmental machinery responsible for providing
appeals puts itself in order." White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976),
aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
60. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977); Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).

Having decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to a hearing before
an administrative law judge within a reasonable time, the Caswell court
then defined "reasonable" more precisely. Neither the applicable statutes 6' nor the Constitution specify any period within which hearings must
be held. Judge Gignoux, however, extrapolating from a variety of related
statutory, judicial, and administrative sources, concluded that ninety days
62
was a "reasonable" time.
In fashioning the appropriate relief, the Caswell court attempted to
minimize the cost of the remedies sought by the plaintiffs. These costs
can be classified in two groups: (1) the total cost of restructuring and
streamlining the Title II appeal process; and (2) the costs incurred by
providing interim benefits to applicants who do not receive a hearing
within ninety days. 63 Although requiring interim benefits could ensure
compliance with the court's order, the accompanying costs may not be
necessary to reduce administrative hearing delays. The Caswell court
chose not to award prospective interim benefits6 because the defendant's
resources could be more effectively utilized by improving the appeals
process and providing prompt hearings. A monitoring system, however,
was adopted to oversee the reduction in hearing delays and ensure that the
65
court's order was not ignored.
Judge Gignoux also attempted to minimize the first class of costs by
allowing the defendant one year to reduce the hearing delay to not more
than ninety days. Additionally, only hearings, not decisions, must occur
within the required time limit, and extensions of the ninety day period
may be granted when the cause of a delay is attributable to the applicant.
Consequently, the District Court accommodated the government interest
in efficient resource allocation.
An administrative scheme must "be fair-and it must work. "66 The
court in Caswell sought to make the SSA fairer by reducing the period of
61. See notes 29-30 supra.
62. The judge cited another section of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. and
1383(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1972)), former enabling regulations (45 C.F.R. § 205.-l0(a)(16) (1973)),
admissions of the defendant. See text at note 23 supra and the decisions in Barnett v.
Mathews (D. Vt. February 22, 1977) and Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A)
(W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976), both of which similarly established ninety day periods for
scheduling hearings. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977). But see White v.
Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977) (court held
that hearings were to be scheduled within 120 days of request).
63. The latter costs would actually entail only those benefits paid to claimants later
found undeserving. Successful appellants receive full retroactive benefits, and the defend-

ant's right to recoupment of payments to nonqualifying appellants will probably not be
significant. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
64. In so doing, the Caswell court followed the Western District of Kentucky in
Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976). The District Court of
Connecticut in White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977), gave the defendant a longer period within which to hold hearings, see note 62

supra, but chose to award interim benefits to appellants not receiving a hearing within that
time.
65. A similar approach was followed in Blankenship v. Mathews, No. C75-0185 L(A)
(W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
66. Richardson v. Pearles, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).

potential deprivation of disability benefits. Whether this judicial order
will "work" is uncertain. Some instances of administrative delay may
not be susceptible to correction by judicial decree. 67 If such causes
account for the Title II disability benefit delay, substantial reduction in
hearings delays may never occur. Other causes of administrative delay
68
may be more amenable to judicial cure.
Apparently the Title II disability system entails certain barriers to
prompt hearings that could be cured by judicially prodding the SSA to
streamline its appeal process. 69 Whether simplification of the administrative appeals process in response to such stimulus will reduce delays
remains to be seen.
The Caswell decision demonstrates that courts will not countenance
continued administrative delay. The case manifests a judicial concern that
agencies discharge their responsibilities expeditiously. At the same time
the courts should not ignore the consequences of compelling speedy
administrative response. Not only will the reduction of case backlog be
difficult, but the cost of protecting claimants who have preliminarily been
found undeserving may ultimately be shared by deserving claimants since
7°
resources available for any program of social welfare are not unlimited.
The courts, however, have struck the balance in favor of prompt disposition of appeals.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-

AN AGENCY'S STATEMENTS OF POLICY ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO PUBLICATION AND FILING REQUIREMENTS. Pennsyl-

vania Human Relations Commission v. Norristown Area School
District, - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 671 (1977).
In a case of first impression,' Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. Norristown Area School District,2 a divided 3 Pennsylva67. See Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The Right to Relief
from Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574, 574-75 (1963). Examples include
crowded dockets resulting from "inadequate appropriations and lack of personnel [which]
demand solutions uniquely available to the Conguess or the agencies themselves." Id. at
575. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
68. Examples include admission of an excessive amount of evidence and unreasonable refusal by an agency to decide a particular case. See Note, Judicial Acceleration ofthe
Administrative Process: The Right to Relief from Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE
L.J. 574,
69.
Program,
70.
U.S. 254,

515 (1963).
See generally Note Administrative Procedure and the Social Security Disability
2 IND. LEGAL F. 295, 314 (1969).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
284 (1970) (Burger, J., dissenting) [Casenote by Henry N. Nassau]
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potential deprivation of disability benefits. Whether this judicial order
will "work" is uncertain. Some instances of administrative delay may
not be susceptible to correction by judicial decree. 67 If such causes
account for the Title II disability benefit delay, substantial reduction in
hearings delays may never occur. Other causes of administrative delay
68
may be more amenable to judicial cure.
Apparently the Title II disability system entails certain barriers to
prompt hearings that could be cured by judicially prodding the SSA to
streamline its appeal process. 69 Whether simplification of the administrative appeals process in response to such stimulus will reduce delays
remains to be seen.
The Caswell decision demonstrates that courts will not countenance
continued administrative delay. The case manifests a judicial concern that
agencies discharge their responsibilities expeditiously. At the same time
the courts should not ignore the consequences of compelling speedy
administrative response. Not only will the reduction of case backlog be
difficult, but the cost of protecting claimants who have preliminarily been
found undeserving may ultimately be shared by deserving claimants since
7°
resources available for any program of social welfare are not unlimited.
The courts, however, have struck the balance in favor of prompt disposition of appeals.
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nia Supreme Court determined that an administrative agency's policy
statement need not be promulgated through the stringent rule-making
procedures required for regulations. Specifically, the court held that the

definition of a racially imbalanced school developed by the Human
Relations Commission to aid in implementing school desegregation plans

was not a regulation and was thus exempt from the filing requirements of
the Administrative Agency Law. 4 The decision provides judicial
guidelines that distinguish between substantive regulations and state-

ments of agency policy.
In 1968 the Human Relations Commission5 formulated two documents entitled "Desegregation Guidelines for Public Schools" 6 and
"Recommended Elements of a School Desegregation Plan." 7 Both documents 8 were designed to aid school districts in developing plans to
O'Brien. Justice Manderino filed a concurring opinion. A dissenting opinion was written by
Justice Pomeroy who was joined by Chief Justice Eagen. The former Chief Justice Jones did
not participate in the decision.
4.

The Administrative Agency Law, formerly codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §

1710.21 (Purdon 1962), provided that "regulations . . . shall have no effect until a copy
thereof, certified by the executive officer, chairman or secretary of the agency, is filed in
... The Administrative Agency Law was replaced in 1969 by
the Department of State.
the Commonwealth Documents Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1101-1611 (Purdon Supp.
1977-78). Certain sections of the Commonwealth Documents Law and its title were repealed. The Norristown court, however, continued to use the title for convenience.
The requirements of the Commonwealth Documents Law that replaced those of the
Administrative Agency Law provide that "[with certain exceptions not applicable to this
note] an agency shall give. . public notice of its intentions to promulgate, amend or repeal
any administrative provision." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1201 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). "Any
administrative regulation or change therein after the effective date [July 1, 1969] of this act
"
shall not be valid for any purpose until filed by the Legislative Reference Bureau ....
The court stated that since the definition was issued before the effective date of the
Commonwealth Documents Law, the definition was not subject to the statute. Rather, the
court applied the Administrative Agency Law, which was in effect when the definition was
issued. - Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 673 n.4. For a discussion of both laws, see Zeiter, The New
General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Commonwealth Documents
Law, 44 PA. B.Q. 109 (1972).
5. The Human Relations Act states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice "for any person being the ... superintendent, agent or employee of any place of
public accommodation . . . to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person because of his
race [or] color . . . either directly or indirectly, any of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities or privileges of such place of public accommodation ..

"PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 43

§ 955(i)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The Human Relations Commission is empowered "to
formulate policies to effectuate the purposes of [the Human Relations] act, and make
recommendations to agencies and officers of the Commonwealth or political subdivisions of
government or. . . school district thereof to effectuate such policies." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

43, § 957(e) (Purdon 1964).
6. The "Desegregation Guidelines for Public Schools" dated March 29, 1968,
contained "the general policies for the Commission and the reasons why desegregation is an
important social goal." - Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 674 n.8. The full text of the "Guidelines" is
contained in Appendix A of the opinion. Id at -, 374 A.2d at 681-82.
7. The "Recommended Elements of a School Desegregation Plan," dated May 15,
1968, "set forth I 1 questions suggesting areas which a school district should consider in
developing a desegregation plan." Id. at -, 374 A.2d at 674 n.9. The full text of the
"Recommended Elements" are contained in Appendix B of the opinion. d. at -, 374 A.2d
at 682-83.
8. Both documents, hereinafter referred to as the "Recommended Elements," were
issued before the passage of the Commonwealth Documents Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, 33

1101-1611 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78) on July 31, 1968.

eliminate segregation in public schools. The key component of the "Recommended Elements" was the Commission's test of what constitutes a
racially imbalanced school: "How nearly does the desegregation plan

bring the per cent Negro pupils in each building to within 30% of the per
cent Negro pupils among the buildings of the same grade span?"

9

During February and March of 1968, the Commission sponsored
meetings and seminars to discuss initiation of school desegregation
plans' ° with Norristown Area School District and other districts. After
approval of Norristown's plan in 1969,11 the Commission filed a complaint in 1972 alleging that the school system failed to desegregate grades

kindergarten through the fourth grade. 12 When negotiations failed, the
Commission scheduled an administrative hearing to determine if a violat3
tion had occurred. Norristown contended that the hearing was illegal
because the "Recommended Elements" were substantive regulations

and, therefore, must be filed with the Department of State as required by
the Administrative Agency Law. 4 Nevertheless, the Commission found a
violation of the Human Relations Act '5 and ordered the school district to
submit a plan to remedy the racial imbalance. 16 The commonwealth court
agreed, 17 holding that the documents were statements of policy, not
9.

-

Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 682.

Because the practical operation of the Commission's definition may not be self
evident, we set forth a sample calculation:
Example One: Assume a school district in which 10% of the elementary school
students are Negroes. Each elementary school of this district must have a
percentage of Negro students in the range of 7-13% (10%x30% (permissible
deviation)=3%, Example Two: As above, but with a Negro percentage of
50%. A school within the range 35%-65% Negro is 'racially balanced', (50% x
30% (permissible deviation)= 15%).
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 59
n.7, 313 A.2d 156, 160 n.7 (1973).
10. The supreme court in Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School
Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967), held that public schools were within the language of
"public accommodations" and that the Commission had jurisdiction to utilize a case-bycase approach to eliminate racial imbalance in public schools.
11. The initial plan submitted by Norristown was rejected because of the school
district's failure to include the methods and a timetable for the correction of the racial
imbalance. A supplementary plan was approved on May I1,1969. While it took steps to
implement the plan during the period between 1969 and 1972, Norristown did not attempt to
correct the racial imbalance in classes from kindergarten through the fourth grade. The
Commission deemed this refusal an amendment to the May 11, 1969 plan and eventually
disapproved the entire plan.
12. The complaint alleged that Norristown discriminated against the pupils within its
school system on the basis of race because "the respondent, the Norristown Area School
District, has allowed and continues to allow the existence of public schools under its
jurisdiction and control which are racially segregated." Record at 3a, Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area School Dist., - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 671 (1977).
13. The allegation of the illegality of the hearing had not been raised before the
hearing. Id. at I la-13a.
71, § 1710.21 (Purdon 1962). See note 4 supra.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43,
15. The Commission determined that Norristown had violated PA. STAT. ANN.tit.
§ 955(i)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
16. Record at 142a.
17. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Norri,;town Area School Dist., 20 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 555, 342 A.2d 464 (1975).

substantive regulations, and this determination was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The supreme court had expressly declined to rule upon the question
of the validity of the "Recommended Elements" despite the Commis-

sions's failure to comply with filing requirements earlier in Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown School District.18 In a

footnote the court warned,
Whether or not the Commissions's definition, formulated in an
administrative procedure of an unspecified nature, adopted
without the broad public notice required under the Documents
Law, and unpublished as a rule or regulation so complies [with
rulemaking procedures] are questions which we do not now
pass upon and which must await proper presentation.19
The court in Uniontown concluded in the same footnote that "[tihe

Commission's definition of a segregated school

. .

is clearly a substan-

tive rule of law; we have so regarded it in this opinion."

20

In Norristown, the commonwealth court, faced with the same issue,
reached the opposite result and determined that the "Recommended
Elements" did not "lay down hard and fast standards with which districts
must comply in order to conform to the law." 2t A majority of the
supreme court adopted the commonwealth courts's language, stating that

the Commission had approved desegregation plans that contained
"school buildings well outside of the 30% guideline recommended by the
Commission.' '22 The dissent, however, noted that the record provided no
23
support for this claim.
Indeed, an examination of several other school desegregation cases
decided before Norristown indicates that the Commission considered the
definition a substantive regulation. The Human Relations Commission
routinely ordered that a desegregation plan "shall conform to all of the
'Recommended Elements of a School DesegregationPlan,' dated May
15, 1968, which is attached hereto and made a part thereof. "24 Even the
18. 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973).
19. Id. at 81 n.29, 313 A.2d at 171 n.29.
20. Id.
21. 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 560, 342 A.2d at 467.
22. - Pa. -, -, 374 A.2d 671, 678 n.27.
23. "It is noted, however, that there is no support in the record in this case for the
majority's statement . . . that the Commission has sanctioned desegregation plans which
are in noncompliance with the 30 percent definition." Id. at -, 374 A.2d at 686 n.8
(Pomeroy & Eagen, JJ., dissenting).
24. Record at 259a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area
School Dist., - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 671 (1977); Record at 275a, Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. New Castle Area School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973); Record at 451a,
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313
A.2d 156 (1973); Record vol. II, at 650a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. New
Kensington-Arnold School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973); Record vol. II, at 666a,
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 6Pa. Commw. Ct.
281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972); Record at 434a-35a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Board of Public Educ. of School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 281, 294 A.2d 410
(1972)(emphasis added).

commonwealth court, which had previously held that the "Recom-

mended Elements" were not hard and fast rules,2" issued an amended
26

final order that paralleled the orders of the Commission.
These orders reveal an intention on the part of both the Commission
and the courts to consider the definition a substantive regulation. The
records in six school desegregation cases also support this contention. In
cases 27 involving large districts, the Commission exempted only three
elementary schools 28 from its orders to eliminate the racial imbalance in

schools that, according to the definition, were segregated. Even the few
schools that were exempted were still deemed racially imbalanced be29
cause of mere noncompliance with the definition.
In the absence of Pennsylvania decisions distinguishing between

statements of agency policy and substantive regulations, the supreme
25. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area School Dist., 20 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 555, 560, 342 A.2d 464, 467 (1975).
26. Record vol. II, at 662a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. New Kensington-Arnold School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973).
27. In the New Kensington-Arnold case, the percentage of Negro pupils in the
elementary grade span was 9.5%. The racial balance range found by the Commission's
definition was 6.5 % - 12.5%. Id. at 633a. Applying that range, the Commission, in its
findings of fact, held that eight of ten elementary schools were racially segregated. Id. at
645a. The percentage of Negroes in the Uniontown elementary schools was 8.4%, and the
racial imbalance range was 5.9% - 10.9%. Record at 439a, Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313 A2d 156 (1973). The Commission,
in its findings of fact, stated that twelve of thirteen elementary schools were racially
imbalanced. Id. at 446a. In the Philadelphiacase, the Commission found that the percentage
of Negro pupils in the elementary schools was 60.1%, that a racially segregated school was
one with less than 42% or more than 78% Negro enrollment, and that 178 of 219 elementary
schools were racially segregated. Record vol. II, at 655a, Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972). In the
Pittsburgh case, the Commission determined that the percentage of Negro students in
elementary schools was 42%, that a racailly segregated school was one with less than 29% or
more than 55% Negro enrollment, and that 75 of the 89 elementary schools were racially
segregated. Record at 425a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Bd. of Educ. of
School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972). Finally, in the
Norristown case, the percentage of Negro enrollment was 23.13% and the racial imbalance
range was 16.2% - 30.1%. Record at 259a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Norristown Area School Dist., - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 671 (1977). In its findings of fact, the
Commission determined that according to the range all of the ten elementary schools were
segregated. Id. at 138a.
28. The Commission ordered the elimination of the racial imbalance in all elementary
schools except for three, Marclay, Ohiopyle, and Wharton, which were located in the
-mountain" segment of the school district. Record at 451a, Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973). The Commission
exempted these racially-segregated schools because of geographical considerations.
29. In Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 23 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 312,352 A.2d 200 (1976), the commonwealth court slightly modified a Commission order to desegregate all Philadelphia schools found racially imbalanced under the
Commission's definition. The court ordered the desegregation of the racially-imbalanced
schools, provided that the plan did not require "pupils transported as the result of reassignment under the plan to be on a bus more than forty-five minutes a day each way to or from
school." Id. at 342, 352 A.2d at 216. The number of schools affected by the modification
was not estimated by the court. The school district, however, was required to justify each
instance in which a school was to remain racially imbalanced. The remaining schools were
ordered to eliminate their racial imbalance as defined by the "Recommended Elements." As
a whole, the practice of the Commission apparently denotes a standard that is, in fact,
virtually inflexible.

court sought guidance from the federal courts. The majority relied heavily
upon the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because of
its extensive experience in reviewing administrative determinations. 30 In
the case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FederalPower Commission ,31

the Federal Power Commission (FPC) issued an order to pipeline
companies concerning curtailment plans during natural gas shortages. A
second Commission order required that these plans establish curtailment
priorities based upon use rather than previous contractual commitments.

The gas companies challenged the orders, alleging that substantive rules
were invalid because the FPC failed to follow the rulemaking procedures
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).32
The court in Pacific Gas, in language echoed by the Norristown
majority, 33 distinguished between substantive rules, which could only be

promulgated in compliance with the APA rulemaking procedures, and
general statements of policy, which were specifically exempted from
such procedures.
The critical distinction between a substantive rule and a
general statement of policy is the different practical effect that
these two types of pronouncements have in subsequent administrative proceedings. A properly adopted substantive rule
establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law.
A general statement of policy . . .does not establish a
'binding norm' . . . . A policy statement announces the agency's tentative intentions for the future. When the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be preparedto
support
3 4the policy just as if the policy statement had never been
issued.
30. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.Norristown Area School Dist., - Pa.
- 374 A.2d 671, 679 (1977).
31. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as APA]. The pertinent
rulemaking procedures of the APA provide as follows:
be published inthe Federal
General notice of proposed rule making shall
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. . . .Except when
notice is required by statute, this subsection does not apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statement of policy statements or rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice.
Id. at § 553(b).
33. - Pa. at-, 374 A.2d at 679. The dissent in Norristown distinguished Pacific Gas
on the grounds that the "natural gas curtailment priorities had a relatively insignificant
impact on the regulated parties. Certainly no one would argue the impact of the de facto
segregation definition before us is less than substantial." Id. at -, 374 A.2d at 686 n.7
(citation omitted).
34. 506 F.2d 33, 38 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). For other formulations of the
meaning of the phrase "general statements of policy," see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 13

(1947); Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J.
581 (1951). See generally Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section

824

The court ruled that the FPC was merely announcing the general policy
35
that it "hoped to establish in subsequent adjudications."The majority ignored an important difference between the Pacific
Gas case and its decision in Norristown. Use of the word "hope"

in

Pacific Gas implied that the policy the FPC hoped to establish was
subject to change. In Norristown, the court stated that the Human
Relations Commission chose to "proceed through individual adjudications consistent with its general statement of policy." 36 In effect, the

majority permits the Commission to issue a "policy statement" and then
adjudicate individual cases upon compliance with that statement. The
word "consistent" implies a solid, concrete standard, not the flexible
standard described in Pacific Gas.

The court's opinion in Pacific Gas reflects merely one of several
modes of analysis used by federal courts in the application of the APA's
general policy statement exemption. The very court upon which the
Norristown majority relied so heavily, however, has in other instances

used an analysis that is significantly different than that employed in
Pacific Gas. In Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,37 the Board

published guidelines enumerating the matters that must be considered in a
decision to parole individual federal prisoners. The Pickus court found
that the general statement of policy exemption was derived from a
legislative purpose that interested parties should have an opportunity to

participate in the promulgation of rules that have a "substantial impact"

38

upon the parties. 39 Because the guidelines would have had a substantial
impact upon federal prisoners who sought parole, the court ruled that the
4°
statement-of-policy exemption was not applicable.
Other circuits have utilized the "substantial impact" test. 4 1 In Texaco, Inc. v. FederalPower Commission,42 the FPC, without complying

with the rulemaking requirements of the APA, ordered compound interest
rates on refunds to consumers. The Third Circuit rejected the contention
553 of the Administrative ProcedureAct to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
430 (1976).
35. 506 F.2d at 41 (emphasis added).
36. - Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
37. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38.

For background to the substantial impact test, see generally, DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-

TIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.01-8 (1976).

39. 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 9.C. Cir. 1974).
40. The basic policy of [§553 of the APA] at least requires that when a proposed
regulation of general applicability has a substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the members or the products of that industry, notice
and opportunity for comment should first be provided.
Pharmaceutical Mfr. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970). See Saint Francis
Memorial Hospital v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
41. The test has been applied to other exemptions of 5 U.S.C. §553(b) (A) (1970). See,
e.g., Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (interpretative rulings);
Akron, C. & Y.R.R. v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Md. 1974) (agency procedure).
42. 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); accord, Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).

that the order was a general statement of policy because it imposed rights
and obligations on an operator and, thus, constituted a substantive rule.43
The Second Circuit adopted the same test in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of
Labor,' in which the Secretary of Labor suspended, without publication,

a precertification list essential to both an alien's admission and continued
residence in the United States. Because the suspension changed the rights
and obligations of aliens, the action was substantive. The court ruled that
the label that a particular agency places upon the exercise of administra-

tive power is not conclusive for the courts-the key element is the manner
45

in which the agency acts.
If the supreme court had applied the "substantial impact" test to
Norristown, a different result might have followed. Use of the definition
changed the rights and obligations of the school district: before the

promulgation of the definition, Norristown was not obligated to desegregate unless the schools were declared racially imbalanced. Noncompliance with the definition's arbitrary standard rendered the school district
racially imbalanced. The record indicates that the Commission did not

attempt to show that the Norristown schools were racially imbalanced by
any means other than the Commission's definition.6 While the Norristown court relied on Pacific Gas, it did not meet the criteria set forth in

that decision.
The supreme court in Norristown created needless difficulties. It

relied upon a federal court decision that does not reflect the majority
view. 47 Further, in applying Pacific Gas, the majority failed to recognize
43. 412 F.2d 740. See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz,- 428 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Cal. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. 469 F.2d 478 (2nd Cir. 1972). Compare Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) with Dimaren v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. 469 F.2d 478, 481-82. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the
particular label placed upon [an action] by the Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for
it is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do and has done which is
decisive." Columbia Broadcasting, System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
See, e.g., Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney General, 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1973); Pharmaceutical Mfr. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
46. See note 27 supra.
47. A third method has been employed by a federal court to require that rulemaking
procedures be used for the promulgation of general statements of policy. In Independent
Brokers-Dealers Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court determined
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had the power to fix reasonable
commission rates and to alter or abolish minimum rate schedules. The SEC had suggested,
by letter to the New York Stock Exchange, that certain fee schedules directly affecting the
Association be abolished. The request, the court ruled, was a statement of policy and as
such ordinarily exempt from general requirements of notice and opportunity for comment.
In this situation, however, the court decided that "it was incumbent on the Commission to
provide such notice as a matter of elementary fairness," id. at 144, and that such fairness
may require that those materially affected have reasonable notice and opportunity for
comment. See Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of InterpretativeRules and
General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L. J. 1047, 1059-61 (1971). Such fairness was not
lacking in the Norristown controversy. The school district had knowledge of the "Recommended Elements" for four years. Record at 140a, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n
v. Norristown Area School Dist., - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 671 (1977).

important distinctions between that case and the Norristown decision.

Finally, the court indulged in needless rhetoric in its statement that the
"Recommended Elements" were not "hard and fast standards" 48 because of their language and form. This strained conclusion could have
been avoided by the use of the legislature's definition of statements of
policy. The Commonwealth Documents Law 49 and its subsequent amendments 50 contain a definition of "policy statements" 5 1 sufficiently broad
to encompass the "Recommended Elements." The Norristown decision

does indicate, however, that promulgation of statements of an administrative agency's policy need not follow the formal rulemaking procedures
required for regulations.
48. See note 21supra and accompanying text.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1101-1611 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). See note 4 supra.
50. 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-907 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
51. A statement of policy has been legislatively defined as
any document, except an adjudication or a regulation, promulgated by an agency
which sets forth substantive or procedural personal or property rights, privileges,
immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of the public or any part thereof and
includes, without limiting the generalities of the foregoing, any document interpreting or implementing any statute enforced or administered by such agency.
45 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
[Casenote by Robert M. Frankhouser, Jr.]

